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Euthanasia: A Comparison of the Criminal Laws of 
Germany, Switzerland and the United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Euthanasia, a subject that has long been a dilemma for medical ethics, has 
received more attention in the last decade than ever before in the United States.! 
Today, the number of situations in which euthanasia is seriously considered has 
increased because of developments in medical technology.2 Individuals who a 
few years ago would have died now may sustain their lives through medical 
technology. An illustration of this trend is the situation where a patient with a 
terminal disease wants to end his suffering and die. Physicians believe the patient 
has weeks, maybe days, to live.3 This situation could pose a problem if the 
individual would rather not have his life sustained by medical technology. 
Euthanasia provides one resolution to this problem.' 
Under the current state of the law in the United States euthanasia is a crime of 
willful homicide. 5 Despite the criminality of the act, physicians continue to 
practice euthanasia. 6 Therefore, ordinarily law-abiding U.S. citizens are ignor-
1. See Ostheimer, TM Polls: Changing Attitudes Toward EuJhanasiLL, 49 PUB. OP!NION Q. 123 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Ostheimer]. Groups concerned with euthanasia have increased enormously in 
members and subscription in the past ten years. In twelve years, concern for Dying, a pro-euthanasia 
organization, has expanded its mailing list from 10,000 in 1967 to 160,000 in 1979. The Euthanasia 
Educational Council grew from 600 members to more than 30,000 from 1969 to 1974. /d. 
2. See Bellegie, Medical Technology As It Exists Today, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Bellegie]. See generally Vfford, Brain Death, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Vfford]. 
These developments include heart-lung machines, pacemakers, respirators, AMI Bennett machine 
(controls the flow of oxygen and CO2 ), cribs (controls the body temperature), and hemodialysis 
machines and monitors. 
3. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1967, at I, col. 8. 
4. See Ostheimer, supra note I, at 123. For a definition and discussion of euthanasia, see § II infra. 
5. See Collester, Death, Dying and tM Law: A ProsecuJorial View oftM Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 
304 (1977); see also Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Agoinst Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislatiun, 42 MINN. 
L. REv. 969 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar]; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 86 (2d ed. 1969); F. 
WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw §§ 137-70 (14th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON'S 
CRIMINAL LAW]. For a discussion of the criminal law in euthanasia, see generally Survey, EuJhanasiLL: 
Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislntive Consitkrations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973); Foreman, 
TM PhysiciLLn's Criminal LiLLbilityfor the Practice of EuthanasiLL, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 54 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Foreman]. In criminal law "willful homicide" is murder when the actor intended to kill, i.e., he 
desired to cause the death of another. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw, supra § 137. Acting "purposely" or 
"willfully" is usually equivalent to acting intentionally.ld. Thus if A has an intent to kill B and fires a gun 
at B desiring to cause his death, and B is actually killed, A would be guilty of willful homicide since A 
intended to kill B. ld. 
6. Levinsohn, Voluntary Mercy Death, 8 J. FORENSIC MEn. 57 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Levinsohn]. 
Mr. Levinsohn sent a questionnaire to more than 250 Chicago internists and surgeons, and 156 replied. 
When asked "In your opinion do physicians actually practice euthanasia in instances of incurable adult 
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ing a criminal law; this result creates a problem for the American criminal justice 
system. The solution to this problem may lie in the consideration of the penal 
codes of Germany and Switzerland. 7 Germany and Switzerland are two nations 
which have express provisions in their penal codess that might mitigate the 
sentence of an individual who has practiced euthanasia.9 These countries con-
sider motive an integral element in determining culpability for a crime. Io The 
motive of an act may be an index to the probability of recidivism for certain 
harms the law desires to prevent. II 
This Comment investigates the criminal law relevant to euthanasia as that law 
now exists in Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Because of the many 
misconceptions concerning the term "euthanasia," the author briefly describes 
the origins, definitions and controversies regarding the term. Commentators use 
two sets of criteria in defining most acts of euthanasia. First, euthanasia might be 
active or passiveY Second, it can be voluntary or involuntary.I3 Because some 
commentators would assign greater guilt to some types of mercy killing than to 
others, the author discusses the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary 
and between active and passive. 
Under current U.S. criminal law, euthanasia is a felony.I4 In some states, 
euthanasia is equated with the crime of assistance in suicide. I5 This Comment 
examines some of the underlying reasons why euthanasia remains a crime in the 
United States. The author also explores the comparison between euthanasia and 
the crime of assistance in suicide. 
sufferers?" 61 % answered in the affirmative. Levinsohn adds that "many doctors are guilty of murder 
today, at least to the extent that they fail to administer every known medical means to prolong life in 
specific instances." Id. at 68. See also Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 499 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as Fletcher]; B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE § 371 (1959). 
7. For authorities on criminal law in these countries, see generally A. ScHOENKE, 
STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR 565 (6th rev. ed. 1952) (Germany) [hereinafter cited as SCHOENKE]; E. 
HAFTER, UHRBUCH DES ScHWEIZERISCHEN STRAFRECHTS ALLGMEINER TElL 352 (2d ed. 1946) (Switzer-
land); C. STOOSS, SCHWEIZERISCHES, STRAFGESETZBUCH, VORENTWURF MIT MOTlvEN (1894) (Switzerland) 
[hereinafter cited as STOOSS]; E. HAFTER, ScHWEIZERISCHES STRAFRECHT 15 (1943) (Switzerland). 
8. (a) Germany - Strafgesetzbuch (STGB) (German Penal Code); (b) Switzerland - Schweizeriches 
Strafgesetzbuch (Swiss Penal Code) [hereinafter cited as Sw. STGB]. 
9. See § IV. B & C infra for a discussion ofSTGB §§ 211-213, 216 and Sw. SlGB arts. 63-64, 111-112, 
114. 
10. STGB §§ 211-212; Sw. STGB arts. 63-64,111-112. 
11. See Hitchler, Motive As An Essential Element of Crime, 35 DICK. L. REv. 105, 110 (1931). 
12. See generally Levin & Levin,DNR: An Objectionable View of Euthanasia, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 567 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Levin]. 
13. See generally Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Morris]. 
14. See generally Kamisar, supra note 5, at 971. 
15. Generally, assistance in suicide refers to a person who assists another in committing suicide. 
Sometimes the assistance may be supplying the deceased with the means of death or by killing him as 
part of a suicide pact. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 5, § 175. See, e.g., McMahan v. State, 168 
Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); Burnett v. People, 204 III. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 
118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904); Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816); People v. Roberts, 211 
Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920). 
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Germany and Switzerland may serve as models for the U.S. criminal law 
system because both countries avoid the problems of making law-abiding citi-
zens, who practice euthanasia, criminals.1 6 This Comment analyzes the penal 
codes of these two European nations, emphasizing the specific provisions that 
either mitigate the sentence or totally exculpate the actor who has practiced 
euthanasia. The author particularly focuses on the concepts of motive and 
"homicide upon request" in relation to euthanasia. Looking at the law in the 
United States, the author considers those states that have enacted "right to die" 
statutes and have accepted the legal validity of the "living will."17 After compar-
ing the criminal law in Germany, Switzerland and the United States, the author 
suggests that the incorporation of several German and Swiss penal code concepts 
with respect to euthanasia into American criminal law would be beneficial and 
equitable. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF EUTHANASIA 
A. The Origin of the Controversy 
In recent years the controversial subject of euthanasia has received a consider-
able amount of public attention. IS Today, with the advances in medical technol-
ogy, death from disease is no longer simplyfait accompli. 19 New medical discov-
16. See § III. B. 1 & 2 infra. 
17. For a discussion of the concept of the living will and right to die statutes see § IV infra. 
18. Ostheimer,supra note I, at 123. A Gallup Poll taken during the 1930's revealed that most people 
at that time did not favor euthanasia for the hopelessly incurable.ld. at 125. However, the National 
Opinion Research Center conducted a poll in 1978 which revealed an amazing turnaround. It revealed 
that approximately 60% of the nation's population favored physicians ending the life of an incurably ill 
patient if the patient and his family requested it. ld. at 128. 
19. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, 1981 HANDBOOK 6-7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SOCIETY]. 
For 200 years legal and medical practitione'rs believed that life existed as long as breathing continued 
and the heart beat.ld. at 6. Modern technology, however, has made possible the continuation of cardiac 
and respiratory systems to be active while the brain has ceased to function. ld. The current trend has 
been to define death as the irreversible loss of brain function.ld. at 7. In May, 1980, the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
met with representatives of the American Bar Association, American Medical Association and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to arrive at the following proposed 
Uniform Determination of Death Act: "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead."ld. Thus far, 26 states have accepted the brain death standard in their 
legislation: ALA. CODE § 31-1 (1979); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 
(1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1980); 1979 Conn. Acts 556 (Reg. Sess.); 1980 Fla. 
Laws 80.216; GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1 (1979); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 327 C-1 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 
54-1819 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1l0Y.., § 302 (b)(Smith-Hurd 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West 
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9: III (West 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 333.102 (1980-1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 
(1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 
(1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301 (g) (1979-1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 146-001 (1979); PA. CODE 
ANN. § 53-459(1979); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t. (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE§ 54-325.5(1979); 
W. VA. CoDE § 16-19-1 (c) (1979); WYO. STAT. § 35-19-101 (1980). 
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eries continually enhance a doctor's ability to prolong life.20 Individuals who a 
few years ago would have died due to particular medical circumstances may now 
have their lives artificially sustained even though their suffering would lead them 
to choose not to prolong their lives. In a situation where life is not the individ-
ual's choice, euthanasia becomes a relevant issue. 
The term "euthanasia" is of Greek origin. It is comprised of the Greek words 
"eu" and "thanatos"; "eu" meaning painless, pleasant and easy, "thanatos" mean-
ing death.21 Thus, euthanasia literally means an easy, painless death.22 In prac-
tice, the act of euthanasia involves the merciful "act or practice of painlessly 
putting to death persons' suffering from (an) incurable and distressing dis-
ease."23 Some observers argue that if the practice of euthanasia were legal, 
physicians would exercise their medical judgment in an unrestrained fashion, 
increasing the possibility of abuse of discretion in relation to a very serious 
matter -life or death. 24 In contrast to this opinion, other observers believe that 
the maintaining of an incurably ill patient and the prolongation of that individ-
ual's suffering is far more offensive than allowing a patient to die peacefully.25 
Such authorities believe that the prolongation of treatment is far more cruel than 
a beneficient death.26 
B. The Voluntary-Involuntary Distinction 
One distinctive feature in a discussion of euthanasia is the presence or absence 
of the patient's consent.27 Euthanasia is voluntary when a patient or his family 
Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts and New York have adopted the brain death standard by court 
decision: State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182,603 P.2d 74 (1979); Lovato v. District Ct., 198 Colo. 419, 601 
P.2d 1072 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1978); New York City 
Health & Hospital Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc.2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). See 
generally Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 
A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968); Levin,supra note 12; Ufford, supra note 2, at 
255. 
20. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 999. 
21. Scher, Legal Aspect of Euthanasia, 36 ALB. L. REv. 674 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Scher]. The 
term euthanasia appeared in the English language in the early seventeenth century, when it meant the 
theory that in certain circumstances a person should be painlessly terminated. More recently euthanasia 
means the act or practice of bringing about a gentle and easy death. See generally J. FLETCHER, MORALS 
AND MEDICINE 172-73 (1954). 
22. See Scher, supra note 21, at 674. 
23. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 497 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
24. See generally Kamisar, supra note 5; Chesterton, Euthanasia and Murder, 8 AM. REv. 486 (1937); 
Miller, Why I Oppose Mercy Killings, WOMEN'S HOME COMPANION, June 1950, at 38 [hereinafter cited as 
Miller]; Walsh, Life is Sacred, 94 FORUM 333 (1935); Gumpert, A False Mercy, 170 NATION 80 (1950); 
Morris, supra note 13. 
25. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1956); Russell, Book Review, 10 
STAN. L. REv. 382 (1958) (reviewing G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 
(1956)); Scher, supra note 21. 
26. Beneficient death is defined as a peaceful, calm death. Scher, supra note 21, at 674. 
27. See generally Montange, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Montange]; Plante, An Analysis of "Iriformed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1968). 
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consents to the practice.28 Recent cases have implicitly accepted voluntary 
euthanasia by recognizing a patient's right to refuse medical care.29 The Massa-
chusetts court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 30 stated that: 
The constitutional right to privacy ... is an expression of the sanctity 
of individual freedom of choice and self determination as funda-
mental constituents of life. The value of life so perceived is not 
lessened by a decision to refuse treatment but the failure to allow a 
competent human being the right of choice.31 
In 'contrast to voluntary euthanasia, involuntary euthanasia usually occurs 
when a patient's consent was not obtained or was unobtainable.32 For example, 
28. See Morris, supra note 13. Morris proposed that the 
word voluntary . .. specifically applies to the right of an adult person who is in command of his 
faculties to have his life ended by a physician, pursuant to his own intelligent request, under 
specific conditions prescribed by law, and by painless means. Thus, voluntary euthanasia 
involves at least two willing persons - a doctor and a patient. 
Id. at 245. (Italics in original.) Morris's proposal seems similar to the "living will," discussed in § V infra. 
Chicago'S famous Waskin's case illustrates voluntary euthanasia. The case involved a 23 year old college 
student who shot his mother three times in the head. Waskins' mother was suffering from terminal 
leukemia and had pleaded with her son to kill her. She herself had attempted suicide by taking sleeping 
pills. Three days later after she had made the request for death, at a time when she was in severe, deep 
pain, her son shot her. The son admitted to having killed his mother and was arrested and charged with 
murder. However, the jury took approximately 40 minutes to find young Waskin not guilty by reason of 
insanity. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1967, at I, col. 8. 
29. See generaUy In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 
376 N.E. 2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, Civil no. F-3-1483 (Morris County Ct. N.J. Jan. 13, 1978); 
In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 
619 (C.P. Northampton County Ct. 1973). 
A ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court allowed the parents of a severely retarded infant (Down's 
Syndrome) to order feedings withheld from the week-old infant. The parents also decided to forego an 
operation to correct a deformity in the child's esophagus. The child subsequently died. Boston Globe, 
Apr. 16, 1982, at 7, col. I. 
30. 373 Mass. 728, 742,370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). The Supreme Judicial Court upheld a patient's 
decision to decline life-prolonging medical treatment on the grounds of the patient's right to privacy 
and self-determination. The case involved a 67 year old man (Saikewicz) suffering from leukemia, with 
an I.Q. of 10 and a mental age of approximately two years old, who was in urgent need of medical 
treatment but was unable to give informed consent for such treatment. The Belchertown State School, 
where Saikewicz was a resident, petitioned for a guardian ad litem with authority to make the necessary 
decisions concerning the care and treatment of the resident. The probate court appointed a guardian 
ad litem, who then filed a report that Saikewicz's illness was an incurable one, and stated that treating 
Saikewicz would not be in his best interest. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426. See also In re Dinnerstein, 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). 
31. SaiJrewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N .E.2d at 426. 
32. See Sanders, Ewlianasia: None Dare CaU It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, AND POL SCI. 351 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Sanders]. Thus far, no one has suggested that the act of involuntary 
euthanasia be legalized. The reason for this is that involuntary euthanasia may then be applied to 
anyone - without consent. This clearly would be an absolute right of death in a physician's hand. In 
cases involving involuntary euthanasia, juries have refused to allow the practice to go unpunished. Id. at 
353. Some examples of cases that involved involuntary euthanasia are: (I) Louis Greenfield 
chloroformed his nine year old imbecile son. The young boy had the mentality of a two year old. 
Greenfield was indicted for first degIee murder. At his trial Greenfield stated, "I did it because I loved 
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doctors might consider involuntary euthanasia when a patient, who has no 
relatives, lapses into a coma, However, U.S. courts have never accepted involun-
tary euthanasia.33 In the example, no one legally could have granted permission 
to the attending physician to terminate the life of the patient, and the law has 
never permitted physicians to exercise their medical judgment in an unre-
strained fashion. 34 
The prohibition on involuntary euthanasia is grounded in the conceptual 
theory of the doctrine of informed consent.35 The doctrine of informed consent 
emerged from the cases involving medical malpractice. Under this doctrine, 
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body .... "36 In contrast, the touching of a 
patient's body without his valid consent is an intentional interference with a 
person or a battery.37 In this case, a physician would be liable in tort. 38 The 
doctor is relieved of such liability only if the patient validly consents.39 Informed 
consent involves two elements: (1) the patient must be given information on the 
risks involved in the treatment; and (2) he must assent to the treatment. If a 
patient is unable to assent to the treatment himself, a relative40 or guardian41 
him, it was the will of God." N.Y. Times, May II, 1939, at 10, col. 2; (2) Louis Repouille had read about 
the Greenfold case and committed the same act. He administered chloroform to his 13 year old imbecile 
son, who had been blind for five years. Repouille was indicted for first degree manslaughter but 
convicted of second degree manslaughter and freed on suspended sentence. N. Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1941, 
at 44, col. I; (3) John Noxon was charged with murder of the first degree when he killed his six month 
old mongoloid son through electrocution. He was convicted and spent four years in prison before 
parole. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,1949, at 16, col. 3; Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 
(1946); (4) Harry Johnson asphyxiated his cancer-stricken wife. A grand jury refused to indict him after 
a psychiatrist testified that he was "temporarily insane." N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1938, at 30, col. 4; (5) Carol 
Ann Paget murdered her father while he was still under anesthesia following exploratory surgery in 
which cancer of the stomach was found. She was released on the grounds of "temporary insanity." N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 8, 1950, at I, col. 2; (6) Harold Mohr was sentenced to three years after he murdered his 
blind, cancer-stricken brother. Testimony showed that his brother had requested to die. N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 8, 1950, at 26. col. I. 
33. See cases discussed in note 32 supra. Courts have tended to show general opposition to this 
practice and have attempted to dissuade others from a similar practice. Juries might prefer to stigmatize 
the actor, who has committed involuntary euthanasia, and perhaps give him some minimal punishment. 
Sanders, supra note 32, at 356. 
34. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus tM 
Preservation of Life. 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 250 (1973). 
35. See Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 79 N.E. 512 (1906). 
36. See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), rev'd on other 
gmunds, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). "The patient's right to an informed 
consent makes no sense without a right to an informed refusal." Montange, supra note 27, at 1648. 
37. See Montange, supra note 37. The intentional touching need not be malicious. "Rather, it is an 
intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not 
sanction." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 
PROSSER]. 
38. See PROSSER, supra note 37, at 31-34. 
39. /d. 
40. Id. 
41. [d. 
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may assent on his behalf. If no such relative or guardian exists, the physician may 
not act, unless treatment is an emergency.42 Therefore, a patient's right to 
self-determination overshadows the physician'S medical evaluation.43 A physi-
cian may terminate life-sustaining treatment for a patient given the requisite 
consent by the patient or his family. However, absent this consent, a physician 
independently may not practice involuntary euthanasia and end medical efforts 
to prolong a human life.44 
C. The Passive-Active Distinction 
Legal and medical authorities have defined another distinction regarding the 
concept of euthanasia - passive and active.45 Passive euthanasia is the act of 
withdrawing life-sustaining apparatus from a terminally ill patient.46 Active 
euthanasia is the direct act of rendering a life-shortening agent to a patientY 
Many commentators have questioned the distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia.48 These commentators argue that both passive and active euthanasia 
result in death, and that no real distinction is necessary since the outcome is 
42. Id. This is known as implied consent. It is reasonable to assume that, if the patient were conscious 
and comprehended the situation, he would consent. Id. Since euthanasia does not involve an emer-
gency situation, discussion of this exception is unnecessary in this context. 
43. id. 
44. See Montange, supra note 27, at 1649. 
45. See Levin, supra note 12, at 572. See also Cannon, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REv. 654 (1970). 
[hereinafter cited as Cannon]. Authorities have defined these concepts as an omission or commission of 
an act. Omission or passive euthanasia occurs when a person wishes to die and informs the physician 
that the physician should not begin lifesaving medical treatment such as respiration or other devices. 
This concept is known as a nonfeasance. Nonfeasance is the passive inaction or failure to take certain 
steps to benefit another. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 339. Generally, those who permit harm to occur do 
not bear responsibility for the harm because the law imposes no general affirmative duty to render 
assistance.ld. at 340. However, a physician-patient relationship would create a duty to render assistance. 
[d. See generally L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 89, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1942); H. R. Moch Co. v. 
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928). Under the law an act of commission to end 
the life of another human being is illegal, active euthanasia. Courts view this affirmative act as murder. 
Cannon, supra, at 65'1; Levin, supra note 12, at 573-74. For cases involving active euthanasia, see note 32 
supra. 
46. See generally Cannon, supra note 45, at 657; Levin, supra note 12, at 573. Prosser notes, however, 
that the drawing of a clear line between acts and omissions is difficult. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 340. 
47. See Levin, supra note 12, at 568. Some of these life shortening agents are air, potassium chloride 
or heavy, lethal doses of narcotics, such as morphine. 
48. Hearings on Death with Dignity Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 
(1972) (statement of Warren T. Reich, Senior Research Scholar, Kennedy Center for Bioethics) 
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings]. The difference between active and passive euthanasia is that "a 
physician may not take a life [active euthanasia], but he does not have to preserve it in all circumstances 
[passive euthanasia]." [d. See also Beau, Legislation et droit a /a mort, Le Monde, Sept. 22, 1977, at 16, col. 3 
[hereinafter cited as Beau], quoting Prof. Louis Vincent-Thomas, a Sorbo nne sociologist who suggests 
putting "an end to the dual absurdity between active and passive euthanasia: there is no difference 
between dying by a poison innoculation or by dying through a withdrawal of life support mechanisms." 
/d. 
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identical.49 However, other commentators argue that the distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia is vital because the manner in which the patient 
dies is the controlling factor. 5o This argument states that an actor is less culpable 
if he fails to act than if he directly caused death by rendering a death-inducing 
agent.51 
Commentators assert that active euthanasia as an intentional act, which is the 
direct cause of death, raises more serious issues and requires careful restrictions, 
if not unconditional prohibition.52 According to this view, active euthanasia is 
equivalent to murder because of the intent to kil1.53 Likewise, this position 
considers passive euthanasia to be less reprehensible than active euthanasia54 
because it is the result of an omission rather than a positive act. Several noted 
philosophers question the validity of differentiating between an act and an 
omission. To these scholars, the failure to act itself constitutes an act. Therefore, 
they would argue the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is spe-
cious.55 These commentators, without examining the moral aspects raised by 
passive euthanasia, merely assert that the distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia, alone, is enough to justify the legalization of passive euthanasia. 
III. THE TREATMENT OF EUTHANASIA IN GERMANY, SWITZERLAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. The Present State of the Law in the United States 
American criminal law currently considers euthanasia to be willful homicide.56 
If an individual performs a voluntary termination of an incurably ill or a 
suffering human being, even with an altruistic motive, he acts with premedita-
tion and deliberation.57 Under the present U.S. system of jurisprudence, this 
49. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 69; Beau, supra note 48, quoting Louis Vincent-Thomas. 
50. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 70. Senior Research Scholar, at the Kennedy Center for 
Bioethics Prof. Reich stated: 
The ethical distinction between active euthanasia and passive. euthanasia or between 
euthanasia and benemortasia, is a significant one even though the difference between permit-
ting death ... and directly causing death ... is not always a convincing one. To stop dialysis, to 
turn off a respirator or to withdraw intravenous feeding may seem to be active, death-inducing 
actions .... But it does make a difference how a person engages himself in causing a death. 
1d. See also Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1005. 
51. See Levin, supra note 12, at 573. 
52. See id. at 573-75. 
53. For a discussion of cases on active euthanasia see note 75 i~fra. 
54. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 999-1000. 
55. 1d. at 1005-14. 
56. See WHARTON'S ·CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 5, §§ 137-70; Foreman, supra note 5, at 54. See also 
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911 (1966). 
57. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822, 411 P.2d at 918. 
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constitutes murder in the first degree, the gravest type of homicide.5~ Murder is 
the unlawful homicide of an individual with malice aforethought.59 
1. Motive 
In euthanasia cases, the defendant's motive leads him to act compassionately 
and, thus, to end the suffering of an incurably ill patient. The American criminal 
justice system, however, makes no provision for the consideration of motive as an 
element of homicide.60 Presently, American criminal law does not accept the 
motive of mercy as a defense to murder. 61 The common law does not recognize 
motive as an element of crime. 62 "If the proved facts established that the defen-
dant in fact did the killing willfully, that is, with intent to kill ... and as the result 
of premeditation and deliberation, thereby implying preconsideration and de-
termination, there is murder in the first degree, no matter what defendant's 
motive may have been .... "63 
Although the statutory law condemns all mercy killings,64 the law in practice is 
in direct opposition to the law in theory.65 When euthanasia occurs, "the law in 
action is as malleable as the law on the books is uncompromising."66 The high 
frequency of failures to indict by prosecutors and grand juries supports this 
conclusion.67 Only two physicians have been indicted for murder after practicing 
euthanasia and both were acquitted.68 One reason for the lack of criminal 
prosecution is that, after consenting to euthanasia, the deceased person's family 
generally is unwilling to cooperate with the prosecutor.69 Another reason for the 
lack of prosecution may be that juries are reluctant to deliver guilty verdicts 
58. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 5, §§ 137-70. 
59. /d. 
60. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 204 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]. 
61. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822, 411 P.2d at 918. 
62. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 204. 
63. State v. Ehlers, 98 N.]. L. 236, 238,119 A. 15, 17 (1922). See also Kutner,Euthanasia: One Process 
for Death with Dignity, Living Will, 54 IND. L.]. 201, 206 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kutner]. 
64. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 971. 
65. /d. 
66. Id. 
67. For a discussion of cases dealing with euthanasia, see note 32 supra. 
68. See Levin, supra note 12, at 575. (I) In 1950, Dr. Hermann Sander was indicted for murder for 
injecting air into the vein of a terminally ill patient. The patient subsequently died from this action. N. Y. 
Times, Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. I; (2) In 1974, Dr. Vincent Montemarano injected a death-inducing 
agent, potassium chloride, into the body ofa cancer-stricken patient. He, too, was indicted for homicide. 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1974, at I, col. I. See also Culliton, The Haemmerli Affair: Is Passive Euthanasia 
Murder?, 190 SCIENCE 1271 (1975). This article discusses the case against a physician who committed 
passive euthanasia in Switzerland. The case raises some other aspects of euthanasia, i.e., politics. 
Haemmerli was indicted for murder, but was later released for lack of evidence. /d. at 1275. 
69. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 243 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. Many of these people who have consented to euthanasia would 
also be criminally responsible for the death of the individual. Thus, they avoid liability by not cooperat-
ing with the prosecutor and still relieve the suffering of the individual. /d. 
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against laymen or physicians who have performed euthanasia out of kindness or 
sympathy for the deceased. 70 The low visibility71 of the practice of euthanasia 
may also explain the lack of criminal prosecution. However, this result is more 
likely "due to the difficulty of proof."72 "Without doctors, nurses and hospital 
authorities complying with reporting statutes, a district attorney has little chance 
to learn of the practice."73 
Even in cases of laymen having practiced euthanasia, acquittals are numer-
ous74 and convictions are extremely rare.75 In reality, U.S. courts recognize the 
mercy motive of the actor in euthanasia cases. 76 Nevertheless, this recognition 
has not altered the fact that courts technically treat euthanasia as homicide. 77 
Regardless of its criminal nature, the practice of euthanasia continues. 78 
70. See Sanders, supra note 32, at 351; see, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 23,1950, at 25, col. 4. (1) Eugene 
Braundorf murdered his daughter, a spastic incapable of speech, because he feared for her future 
should he die. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1953, at 20, col. 7; (2) 
Herman Nagle shot to death his 28 year old daughter who was afflicted with cerebral palsy. The jury 
deliberated for 20 minutes and acquitted Nagle on the ground of temporary insanity; (3) Woodrow 
Collums, 69, shot to death his terminally ill brother at a nursing home. Collums was sentenced to 10 
years deferred judgment, later altered to 10 years probation. Associated Press, Mar. 5, 1982, PM cycle. 
71. Low visibility basically means that no one, family or patient, complains to a district attorney after 
they have consented to euthanasia because the parties involved agree that they have taken the best 
course of action. Robertson, supra note 69, at 243. "Nor do district attorneys customarily read the 
medical journals in which these issues have been discussed .... On occasion a particular case is widely 
publicized." Publicity is rare. [d. at 243-44. 
72. Montange, supra note 27, at 1662. Difficulty of proof results from the fact that the evidence 
necessary to convict an individual who has committed euthanasia is very well concealed in the deceased's 
body. Morphine is extremely difficult to detect. 
73. Robertson, supra note 69, at 244. 
74. [d. 
75. (1) See, e.g., Levin, supra note 12, citing Chicago Daily News, Aug. 10, 1967, at 1. William 
Reinecke, 84 years old, was charged with murder after strangling his 74 year old wife who suffered 
from terminal cancer. Reinecke was later placed on probation after the state's attorney said the 
defendant was no longer a threat to society. [d.; (2) Levin,supra note 12, citing Chicago Sun Times, Feb. 
21, 1980, at 14. Paul Alden murdered his 39 year old wife who suffered from a progressive and 
irreversible brain disease which caused premature senility. Alden received five years probation. [d.; (3) 
In the case of People v. Werner, the defendant suffocated his hopelessly crippled, bedridden wife. 
Werner pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter. The court found him guilty but after testimony 
from his children and other showings of the great devotion defendant had for his wife, the court 
allowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered. The court upheld the not guilty 
plea. Crim. No. 58-3636 Cook Co. Ct., III. Dec. 30, 1958. The transcript of this case may be found in 
Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLO. L. REv. 178, 184-86 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wil-
liams]; (4) The Suzanne van de Put case received international attention. This Belgian case involved a 
woman and four of her relatives who were tried for the murder of her eight day old thalidomide-
deformed baby daughter. The jury acquitted all five defendants because the actors had acted with 
unselfish motives. Life, Aug. 10, 1962, at 34-35. 
76. The court in People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822, 411 P.2d 911, 918 
( 1966) stated that: "Thus, one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward his victim and believes his 
act is morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend that society 
prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief." [d. 
77. [d. 
78. See Levinsohn, supra note 6, at 68. 
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2. Bases for the Continued Criminalization of Euthanasia 
One reason that euthanasia is a crime in the United States IS a belief that 
legalized euthanasia would result in mass euthanasia and, in time, genocide.79 
Opponents submit that the creation of the right to choose an easy 
death under certain circumstances will weaken the psychological and 
moral fabric of society by reducing the absolute value placed on 
human life, and that it will eventually lead to the acceptance of the 
idea that others may have the right to choose death for an individual 
under certain circumstances.so 
Some opponents of legalized euthanasia do not challenge the right of the 
individual to choose an easy death; rather these opponents object to the creation, 
in another, of a legal right of execution.sl Thus, these opponents would allow a 
patient the right to die, but would not grant a physician the right to terminate 
that patient's life.s2 These same opponents have further argued that the abuse of 
euthanasia legislation may lead ultimately to the elimination of the aged and the 
congenitally defective.s3 The Nazi experience in Germany supports this 
theory.s4 
The Nazi regime operated under a theory that advocated the destruction of an 
individual who was useless to society in order to relieve society of a burden.ss 
79. Kutner, supra note 63, at 220. Regarding the Nazi practice of euthanasia, see A. MITSCHERLICH & 
F. MIELKE, DAS DIKTAT DER MENSCHENVARACHTUNG (1947). See also Judgment of the International 
Tribunal, in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
Proceedings of Sept. 30, 1946 at 490-91, and Proceedings of Oct. I, 1946 at 546-47, cited in Silving, 
Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal LAw, 103 U. PA. L. lu:v. 350, 356 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 
Silving]. 
Victor Brack, the Chief Administrative Officer in Hitler's private chancellory, testified that the 
German Nazis first applied euthanasia as a blessing only for true Germans and the Nazis excluded 
German Jews from the program. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL UNDER CoNTROL CoUNCIL LAw, No. 10,877-80 (1950), cited in Kamisar,supra note 5, at 1033. 
For a discussion on euthanasia and the Nazi experience and usage of genocide, see Koessler, Euthanasia 
in the Hadamar Sanatorium and International LAw, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. ScI. 735 (1953) 
[hereinafter cited as Koessler]. 
80. Sanders, supra note 32, at 354. 
81. Id. See also Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1011. 
82. See Sanders, supra note 32, at 354. 
83. Kutner, supra note 63, at 220. See also Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1032. 
84. Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, 139 J.A.M.A. 131, 142 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 
Ivy]. Ivy concludes that euthanasia was a major factor which led to "mass killing of the aged, the 
chronically ill, 'useless eaters' and the politically undesirable." Id. Alexander, Medical Science Under 
Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. MED. 39, 44 (1949). Both Drs. Leo Alexander and A. C. Ivy were expert 
medical advisors to the prosecution at the Nuremburg Trials. Id. 
85. 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Nuremburg 
1947, at 247, cited in Koessler,supra note 79, at 736. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 
made this statement concerning this policy: 
Reference should also be made to the policy which was in existence in Germany by the summer 
of 1940, under which old-aged, insane, and incurable people, "useless eaters," were trans-
ferred to special institutions where they were killed, and their relatives informed that they had 
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Karl Binding86 called this theory "destruction of a life not worth living."87 Thus, 
the Nazis expanded the use of euthanasia from being a voluntary practice to 
include the "elimination of the mentally ill and defective, and finally as a ratio-
nale for genocide."88 Some scholars theorize that the German public during the 
Nazi era never believed that the merciful act of euthanasia would be abused and 
utilized as a weapon to cause such a horrifying result. Opponents of legalized 
euthanasia argue that the Nazi experience could recur in the United States.89 
They worry that someday legalized euthanasia may undermine the American 
belief in the sanctity of life by increasing the possibilities for abuse by the medical 
profession.90 
The risk of mistake91 is another factor underlying arguments for maintaining 
criminal sanctions against persons who practice euthanasia.92 Mistakes by a 
physician are always possible.93 Opponents of legalized euthanasia contend that 
a physician's faulty diagnosis or prognosis may cause unwarranted death.94 The 
risk of mistake encompasses not only the possibility of a mistake in the diagnosis 
of a patient's illness but also in the prognosis for recovery.9S With respect to this 
latter issue, many physicians argue against legalized euthanasia because of the 
irreversibility of the act.96 Major advancements in medical technology97 create a 
[d. 
died from natural causes. The victims were not confined to German citizens, but included 
foreign laborers, who were no longer able to work, and were therefore useless to the German 
war machine. It has been estimated that at least some 275,000 people were killed in this 
manner in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums, which were under the jurisdiction of the 
defendant Frick, in his capacity as Minister of the Interior. How many foreign workers were 
included in this total it has been quite impossible to determine. 
86. A. HOCHE & K. BINDING, DIE FREIGABE DER VERNICHTUNG LEBESUNWERTEN LEBENS (1920). 
87. [d. This idea was not really an original one; men like Martin Luther believed in the same concept. 
See generally 8 TISCHREDEN No. 5207 (Clemen ed.). 
88. Kutner, supra note 63, at 220. 
89. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1030-37; Ivy, supra note 84, at 132. Ivy states: 
It is ... interesting that there was so much talk against euthanasia in certain areas of Germany, 
particularly in the region of Wiesbaden, that Hitler in 1943 asked Himmler to stop it. But, it 
had gained so much impetus by 1943 and was such an easy way in crowded concentration 
camps to get rid of undesirables and make room for newcomers that it could not be stopped. 
The wind had become a whirlwind. 
[d. 
90. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1030-37. 
91. Risk of mistake incorporates the possibilities of a physician making an error in diagnosing or 
prognosing an illness. Laszlo, Colmer, Silver & Standard, Err(fTs in Diagnosis and Management of Cancer, 
33 ANNS. INT'L MEn. 670 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Laszlo]. 
92. See Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1005. 
93. See Miller, supra note 24, at 39. 
94. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1005-13. 
95. See Laszlo, supra note 91, at 670. 
96. See Wolbarst, Legalize Euthanasia!, 94 FORUM 330, 332 (1935). These physicians point out the 
fallibility of the profession. One commentator dramatized this point by using Dr. Richard Cabot as an 
example: 
He was given the case records of two patients and asked to diagnose their illnesses .... The 
patients had died and only the hospital pathologist knew the exact diagnosis beyond doubt, for 
he had seen the descriptions of the post-mortem findings. Dr. Cabot, usually very accurate in 
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possibility that a cure or some measure of relief for a given ailment may come 
within the life expectancy of the patient.98 
A further reason that legalized euthanasia has failed to gain strong approval in 
the United States is the attitude of society as a whole.99 In some respects, the 
American public is uneasy with the subject of death. 100 Funeral parlors attempt 
to make the deceased appear as life-like as possible. lol Americans center their 
lives around the young and living. l02 This death denying attitude is manifest in 
the criminalization of euthanasia. l03 By criminalizing the act, society has avoided 
the discomfort associated with the acknowledgement of death. 
3. Assistance In Suicide 
The continuing opposition to legalized euthanasia emanates from the fact that 
opponents equate the practice with the crime of assistance in suicide. l04 These 
opponents believe that legalized voluntary euthanasia would result in "suicide by 
proxy."105 Under English common law, suicide has always been a criminal 
offense. l06 Following common law tradition, some U.S. states still consider at-
his diagnosis, that day missed both. The chief pathologist who had selected the cases had 
purposely chosen two of the most deceptive cases to remind the medical students and young 
physicians even at the end of a long and rich experience one of the greatest diagnosticians 
[Cabot] of our time was still not infallible. 
Miller, supra note 24, at 39. 
97. See note 2 supra. 
98. Pro fi elm: ShaU We LegaliZil "Mercy Killing1," READERS DIG., Nov. 1938, at 94-96. Dr. James states: 
"It must be little comfort to a man slowly coming apart from multiple sclerosis to think that, fifteen years 
from now, death might not be his only hope." Id. at 94. 
99. E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DVING (1969). (Dr.) K.-Ross relates that 
"when I was a child, people [in Switzerland] used to be born at home and often died at home. 
Dying patients were not very often institutionalized. This did not make dying easier for the 
dying patient, but I think most important of all, it helped the children and grandchildren to 
learn that death is part of life. . . ." 
1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 10. (Dr.) K.-Ross has outlined her book ON DEATH AND DVING into 
stages, ranging from acceptance, where the individual has accepted the faith of impending death, to 
resignation, where the patient resigns and becomes depressed. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 11. 
100. P. ARIES, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH (1980). 
101. Id. See also 1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 13. 
102. Wellborn,Death in America: No Llmger a Hidden Subject, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Nov. 13, 1978, 
at 67-70. The author states that: 
Americans emphasize youth, beauty and physical fitness. Fewer than 25% have wills, and 
many seem to consider death an embarrassment that should not be discussed openly. This 
country is a leader in the use of heroic medical efforts to preserve life, and commonly isolates 
terminal patients in institutions throughout their illnesses. 
Id. at 68. 
103. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 48, at 12-13. 
104. Kutner, supra note 63, at 205. 
105. Id. at 220. 
106. See Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903). "By the English common law suicide was 
a felony, and the punishment for him who committed it was interment in the highway with a stake 
driven through the body and the forfeiture of his lands, goods, and chattels to the King." 1d. at 222, 68 
N .E. at 510. However in Burnett, the court also stated "but as we have never had a forfeiture of goods, or 
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tempted suicide a crime. lo7 More important, however, under the common law, 
one who assists another in a suicide is considered a principal to murder. lOB Three 
different views on the criminal liability of one who assists another in committing 
suicide currently exist. A few jurisdictions still consider assistance.in suicide to be 
murder. lo9 Other jurisdictions deal with this situation specifically by statute, 
considering it either as voluntary manslaughter llO or as a separate crimeYI 
Some state legislatures which have characterized this as a separate crime treat the 
crime as involuntary manslaughter; 112 others treat the crime as a minor offense 
and only require the payment of a fine. 113 In contrast, the Texas legislature has 
determined that suicide is not a crime and, therefore, has decriminalized the act 
of assisting another in suicide. 114 
The parallels to be drawn between the aider and abettor of a suicide and a 
physician performing euthanasia are patent. However, a qualitative distinction 
between the two exists. Although both parties desire and accomplish the same 
objective - death, the circumstances are distinctly different; whereas suicide 
involves an otherwise healthy individual who wants to die because of "severe 
seen fit to define what character of burial our citizens shall enjoy, we have never regarded the English 
law as to suicide as applicable to the spirit of our institutions." !d. at 222. 68 N.E. at 510. For a further 
discussion on the law of suicide and euthanasia, see A. DOWNING, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 
(1969). 
107. See State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d. 854 (1961). North Carolina maintains attempted 
suicide as a misdemeanor. See also State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 12 S.E. 310 (1891). S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-122 (Law. Co-op 1962) retains the common law character of felony for attempted suicide. 
Presently, in the United States there is no punishment attached to a successful suicide. LA FAVE & 
ScOTT, supra note 60, at 569 n.3. 
108. LA FAVE & ScOTT, supra note 60, at 571-72. 
109. See, e.g., (I) McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910). Pursuant to a suicide pact, the 
deceased shot himself in the presence of the defendant; however, the defendant did not shoot himself. 
The court held that since suicide is self-murder, the defendant who encouraged was guilty as a principal 
to murder. Id.; (2) Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903). Both the deceased and the 
defendant admitted to having taken poison as a result of a suicide pact. The defendant survived. The 
court indicated that this would be murder on the defendant's part; (3) Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 
637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904). The court held that one who aided another in the commission of suicide was 
guilty of homicide as an accomplice; (4) Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816). The defendant, 
a prisoner, advised a fellow prisoner who was to be executed the following day to "cheat" the hangman, 
i.e., to commit suicide. The Supreme Judicial Court instructed the jury that if the advice was the 
persuading element, then the fellow prisoner would be guilty of murder; (5) People v. Roberts, 211 
Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920). The defendant-husband in this case prepared Paris greens (a poison) 
for his wife and placed it near her bedside at her request. The court convicted Roberts of murder as an 
accomplice to her suicide. 
110. Connecticut and New York treat the aiding and abetting of a suicide as manslaughter. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-13 (West 1949); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15 (McKinney 1965). 
Ill. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1970), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (1963), N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-2-4 (1963) and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982) treat the act ofaiding and abetting a suicide 
as a separate crime. 
112. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1970). 
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (1963). 
114. Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925). Defendant furnished the means for 
committing suicide but the court held no crime existed. 
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despondency,"!!5 euthanasia involves a terminally-ill individual. Further, legisla-
tive euthanasia would be distinct from suicide if practiced pursuant to legislative 
safeguards. These distinctions may be sufficient to justify a separate legal treat-
ment for euthanasia. 
Euthanasia remains a crime in most jurisdictions in the United States.us In 
determining a defendant's guilt or innocence for homicide, courts focus on the 
question of intent rather than that of motive.!!7 Even a benevolent motive does 
not alter the fact that intent to end the life of another human exists. Therefore, 
euthanasia, which, by definition, is a merciful act, is, nevertheless, condemned by 
American criminal law. 
B. German and Swiss Penal Codes 
1. Motive 
Although most U.S. criminal justice systems believe that "motive is immaterial 
in substantive criminal law and that the most laudable motive is no defense [to a 
crime],"I1~ some European criminal law systems!19 consider motive a crucial 
factor in determining culpability.!20 Germany and Switzerland are two such 
countries whose penal codes consider motive as an important element in deter-
mining culpability.12! 
Motive, in common usage, is "the desire coupled with the intention to bring 
about a certain consequence as an end, by means of other consequences which 
are also desired and intended but only as means."122 The role that motive plays 
in euthanasia is integral.!23 For example, when a physician performs euthanasia 
on an incurably ill patient, his intent may be to terminate the patient but his 
motive is to relieve the patient's suffering. This illustration suggests that whereas 
intent is limited to the physician's purpose to commit the act, motive involves the 
question of why he performed the act.!24 
The penal codes of Germany and Switzerland consider the motive of the actor 
in both the grading of the offense and the sentencing of the crime.125 These two 
countries adhere to the idea that once the judge considers the motive of the 
lI5. Scher, supra note 21, at 679. 
116. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 5, §§ 137·70. 
lI7. LA FAYE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 204. 
lI8. Id. 
119. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. 
120. Silving, supra note 79, at 351. 
121. See STGB §§ 2l1-212; Sw. STGB §§ 63·64, lIl-112. 
122. Cook, Act, Invention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 660-61 (1917). For further 
definitions, see State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200,136 S.W. 316 (19l1); Ball v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 601, 
101 S.W. 956 (1907). 
123. See Scher, supra note 21, at 676. 
124. LA FAYE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 204. 
125. STGB §§ 211-212; Sw. STGB §§ 63-64, IlI-112. See also Scher, supra note 21, at 674. 
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actor, the character and personality of the criminal becomes apparent. 126 The 
character and personality of the actor reveal the possible recidivist potential of 
the criminal.127 The personality of the actor encompasses "the character of the 
actor, his dangerousness or harmlessness, [and] the probability or improbability 
of his repeating the crime."128 Thus, in a prosecution for euthanasia, the judge 
would direct his attention to the total personality of the actor and not merely to a 
partial view of the homicide.129 Under this approach, the judge can better view 
the entire incident and thus be better prepared to render a fair and equitable 
sentence.130 
One of the reasons for the inclusion of the concept of motive in some of the 
European penal codes is that the consideration of motive usually assists the 
judge in his decision making. l3l This assistance allows a judge to interpret the 
laws in a manner which best corresponds to general legal principles. 132 Unlike 
American case law, which allows a judge to interpret statutes at his own discre-
tion, many European penal codes133 stress the fact that "a judge cannot give any 
meaning to the law other than the meaning which clearly arises either from the 
words and context of the law or from the clear grounds of the law."134 Therefore, 
while an Americanjudge may, at his discretion, consider a homicide defendant's 
motive, the judge, under the German and Swiss systems, is required to investi-
gate motive.13s Moreover, a homicide defendant will be guilty of one crime with 
a given punishment if his motive is of a certain type, and be guilty of a different 
crime with a mitigated punishment if his motive is something else.136 A German 
or Swiss judge may not, therefore, refuse to mitigate a sentencel37 even if the 
defendant has a benevolent motive. In contrast, an Americanjudge may exercise 
126. STooss, supra note 7, at 147; SHving, supra note 79, at 361. Silving believes that the true 
character of the actor will not be apparent unless the underlying motives of the actor are considered. 
One must first enter the mind to know what is actually driving the individual to commit such acts. 
Silving, supra note 79, at 361. 
127. Silving, supra note 79, at 361. 
128. [d. 
129. See note 126 and accompanying text supra. For further details, see R. MAURACH, DEUTSCHES 
STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TElL 35 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MAURACH); ScHOENKE, supra note 7, 
at 564. 
130. See MAURACH, supra note 129; ScHOENKE, supra note 7, at 564. See also A. DALCKE, STRAFRECHT 
UND STRAFVERFAHREN 148 n.2 (37th rev. ed. 1971). 
131. See STOOSS, supra note 7, at 147; MAURACH, supra note 129, at 35. 
132. Silving, supra note 79, at 361. 
133. For examples of how judges interpret statutes at their own discretion, see note 32 supra, and 
cases discussed therein. 
134. The Prussian Code § 46, quoted in A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL CODE SYSTEM 81 (2d ed. 1977). 
The basic premise of this statement is that judges have an expressed set of guidelines in the penal code 
which directs them to include the motive concept. [d. 
135. Sw. STGB arts. 63-64; STGB §§ 211-212. 
136. Sw. STGB arts. 63-64; STGB §§ 211-212. 
137. Sw. STGB arts. 63-64; STGB §§ 211-212. 
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his discretion to impose a harsh sentence even if the defendant acted out of the 
best of motives. 13B 
Prior to Germany and Switzerland's adoption of the motive standard,139 most 
civil law countries140 evaluated homicide by the premeditation and deliberation 
test. 141 One of the reasons for the earlier existence of the premeditation and 
deliberation test in European penal codes was that the test provides a guide for 
predicting whether or not a criminal would repeat his criminal act. 142 However, 
the use of motive as a standard for determining culpability has caused the 
decrease in importance, or total disappearance, of the premeditation and delib-
eration test. 143 Today, Germany and Switzerland apply the concept that the type 
of motive which determines the criminal act144 bears on the character and 
personality of the actor145 and thus is the best indicator for predicting whether 
or not a person will repeat a criminal act. 146 Some commentators argue that, 
whereas a criminal who murders for personal gain or lust may be expected to do 
so again, an individual who has once committed euthanasia is hardly likely to 
become a habitual criminal. 147 
2. German Penal Code Provisions 
The German Penal Code has abandoned the premeditation and deliberation 
test. 148 Indeed, the German Penal Code never expresses the term "premedita-
138. See LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 204. 
139. For a discussion of the concept of motive and its pertinent provisions, see V. GSOVSKI, THE 
STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAw OF GERMANY (1947) [hereinafter cited as GsOVSKI]. 
140. See note 7 supra. 
141. See LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 562-68. The terms "premeditate" and "deliberate" are 
not easy terms to define. "Premeditation" requires that an individual reflect, at least for a short period of 
time before his act of killing. "Deliberation" requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection. Some 
criminal lawyers have suggested that for premeditation the killer asks himself the question "Shall 1 kill 
him?" The deliberation part of the crime requires a thought such as "Wait, what about the conse-
quences? Well, do it anyway."!d. at 563-64. See also State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 253, 119 S.E. 31, 34 
(1938). The court stated that deliberation means the act is done in a "cool state of the blood." !d. 
142. Silving, supra note 79, at 362. 
143. See GSOVSKI, supra note 139, at 126. The inadequacy of the premeditation and deliberation test 
may be seen by comparing a series of cases dealing with the distinction between murder in the first 
degree and murder in the second degree. Compare United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617 (D. Hawaii 
1949), with Jones v. United States, 175 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1949); see also Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273 
(5th Cir. 1949); Fischer v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). For criticism of the premeditation and 
deliberation test, see Keedy, A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fischer v. United States, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 
267 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Keedy]. On the desirability of considering motive in American 
criminal law, see Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1277 
(1937). 
144. See STOOSS, supra note 7, at 147. 
145. [d. 
146. Silving, supra note 79, at 362. 
147. [d. Stooss, a Swiss commentator, also believed that motive was the best indicator for possible 
recidivism of a criminal act. STOOSS, supra note 7, at 147. 
148. See GSOVSKI, supra note 139, at 126, for a collection of the pertinent provisions and those that 
have been abandoned. 
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tion" in the definitions of the felonies of murder and manslaughter. 149 One of 
the reasons for the abandonment of the test is the inadequacy of the distinction 
between different classes of homicide. 150 Today, the German Penal Code states 
that a murderer is "anybody who kills a human being out of murderous lust, or 
to satisfy a sexual urge, or out of greed or from other base motives, maliciously 
or cruelly, or by means endangering the public, or in order to commit or cover 
up another punishable act."151 In the absence of a "base motive,"152 one who 
commits intentional homicide is a manslayer/ 53 whose punishment would be 
much less severe than that of a murderer. 154 The distinguishing factor between a 
murderer and a manslayer is that a murderer "kills a human being ... with base 
motives"155 or in a manner which reveals a depraved mind. 156 Although the 
German Penal Code does not directly define "base motives," the language im-
plies that "base motives" include "committing a crime out of greed,"157 "lust for 
kiliing"15B or "satisfying a sexual urge."159 By implication, a person committing 
euthanasia would not appear to possess any of the designated "base motives" 
because his motive is benevolent. Since these base motives tend to indicate the 
existence of a depraved mind, a quality which would not likely be attributed to 
the performer of euthanasia, that person should not fall within the definition of 
a murderer.160 However, the person practicing euthanasia may be prosecuted as 
a manslayer.161 Section 212 of the German Penal Code defines a manslayer as 
one who "without being a murderer, intentionally kills a human being."162 
Under this provision, such a person "shall be punished, as a manslayer, by 
confinement in a penitentiary for not less than five years."163 Thus, a physician 
who has practiced euthanasia would not be tried as a murderer because he lacks 
149. See STGB §§ 211-212. 
150. See GSOVSKI, supra note 139, at 126. See also Keedy, supra note 143. Generally in the United 
States there are four degrees of homicide: first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. LA FAVE Be ScOTT, supra note 60, at 562-68. 
151. STGB § 211. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 212. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Silving, supra note 79, at 150. 
157. STGB § 212. 
158. Id. 
159. Id 
160. See Silving, supra note 79, at 364-65. The difference between the United States and Germany in 
this area is that the United States has no express provisions considering the "base motives" of the actor. 
Thus, an actor who has committed euthanasia has committed an act voluntarily with an intent to kill 
(premeditated with deliberation). The actor would be guilty of first degree murder. Cannon,supra note 
45, at 657. 
161. Absense of "base motives" may cause the action to be prosecuted under German Penal Code 
§ 212, manslaughter, not § 211, murder. Silving, supra note 79, at 363. 
162. See STGB § 212. 
163.Id. 
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the base motives, but rather as a manslayer. Consequently, he would benefit 
from the manslaughter provision by receiving a mitigated sentence l64 as op-
posed to a harsher murder sentence. 
Section 213 of the German Penal Code further provides a reduction of penalty 
if "other extenuating circumstances" exisL I6s The German penal system equates 
extenuating circumstances with honorable motives. 166 Thus, a person who has 
committed euthanasia with honorable motives may be able to benefit from 
Section 213, which mitigates the penalty of manslaughter in the case of "ex-
tenuating circumstances."167 
A person who is prosecuted for euthanasia under the German system would 
benefit from two key aspects of the German Penal Code. First, he would be 
prosecuted for manslaughter rather than murder.168 The penalties for man-
slaughter are less severe than for murder. Second, due to his honorable motives, 
the defendant would receive a mitigated sentence.169 
3. Swiss Penal Code Provisions 
As under the German criminal code, the Swiss standard for determination of a 
murderer does not have to do with deliberation and premeditation, but with 
motive. The Swiss Penal Code states that the "true mark of a murder[er] is the 
depraved mind I 70 (base attitudes or mentality) or the dangerousness of the 
actor."171 Article 112 of the Swiss Penal Code, which deals with murder, pro-
Id. 
164. Id. 
165. The German Penal Code ~ 213. translated by Mueller and Buergenthal, states: 
If the person charged with manslaughter was provoked into a fit of anger, without fault of 
his own, by a battery or serious insult, committed by the deceased against the defendant or one 
of his relatives, and the defendant was prompted instantly to commit the deed, or if other 
extenuating circumstances [sic ] are present, the punishment shall be imprisonment for a term 
of not less than six months. 
166. Silving, supra note 79, at 367. Silving states that this section includes honorable motive as an 
extenuating circumstance. Id. 
167. Id. at 366. For a differentiation between base motives and honorable motives, see Decision of 
Mar. 9, 1951,77 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes, Amtliche Sammlung (B G IV) 
at 57, where a woman gave her husband poison several times at intervals in order to run away with her 
lover. The court held that: 
Appellant attempted to kill under circumstances ... which disclose her particularly reprehen-
sible attitude. The motive was particularly reprehensible: appellant wished to kill her husband 
in order to be able to marry her lover with whom she entertained an adulterous relation .... 
The serious effects of the first attempt at murder did not deter her from repeating the act. No 
sooner did Hans Eggman recover after a long illness ... [when] she repeated the attempt 
with more effective means. 
Translation by Silving, supra note 79, at 366. The court viewed this as a base motive with a clear intent to 
kill for lust or greed. /d. See also Decision of Dec. 5, 1969,95 B G IV, at 162, 167. 
168. Silving, supra note 79, at 366. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 365. 
171. Id. 
552 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL &: COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. VI, No.2 
vides: "Where the actor (killer) killed under circumstances or with a premedita-
tion, which shows that he possesses a particular reprehensible attitude (depraved 
mind) or that he is dangerous, he shall be punished by confinement in a 
penitentiary for life."172 For a judge to obtain a clear indication of a depraved 
mind, he must observe the mentality, character and personality of the actor. 173 
Only after the judge has made this observation, may he render a fair and 
appropriate sentence. l74 
Although the Swiss Penal Code includes the term "premeditation," 175 the term 
is neither an exclusive176 nor a sufficient test for homicideY7 The Swiss Penal 
Code takes the actor's premeditation into account only to express the actor's 
dangerousness or his perverse mentality, rather than as a conclusive element of 
the crime.178 The reason for this limited usage of the term "premeditation" is 
that the actor's premeditation "is not a necessary element of murder, for the 
danger which the actor represents and his depraved mind may also appear from 
other circumstances,"179 such as the motive of the actor. The Swiss Penal Code, 
thus, places more weight on the motive of the actor than the actor's premedita-
tion.180 Like the German Penal Code,181 the Swiss Penal Code determines the 
harmlessness or dangerousness of the actor through an analysis of his motives. 
One way that the Swiss Penal Code differs from the German Penal Code is that 
the Swiss Code expressly allows a judge to mitigate the punishment of a defen-
dant who acted with honorable motives.182 More important, however, the Swiss 
Penal Code directs ajudgeto "mete out punishment in accordance with the guilt 
of the actor."183 The defendant's motive is relevant to the judge's determina-
tion.184 The Swiss Penal Code has to do with the manner in which ajudge deals 
172. Sw. STGB art. 112. 
173. See Srooss, supra note 7, at 147. See also O. GERMANN, DAS VERBRECHEN 1M NEUEN STRAFRECHT 
(1950) [hereinafter cited as GERMANN] for a discussion on various motives, such as compassion. See 
also A. VON OvERBECK &: P. THORMANN, ScHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH, 1 ALLGEMEINER TElL 136 
(1940) for a discussion on euthanasia and the Swiss Penal Code. 
174. See STOOSS, supra note 7, at 147. 
175. Sw. STGB art. 112. 
176. Silving, supra note 79, at 365. 
177. ld. See also Decision of Feb. II, 1944, 70 B G IV, at 5 where the court took into account the 
actor's premeditation as to the dangerousness of the actor, but this was not the sole means by which to 
discover that danger. 
178. Silving, supra note 79, at 365. 
179.ld. 
180. ld. See generally Sw. STGB arts. 63-64. 
181. See STGB §§ 211-12. The term "qualified" means that the dangerousness of the actor becomes 
apparent through the actor's motive.ld. See also STOOSS, supra note 7, at 147; Sw. STGB arts. 63-64. 
182. Sw. STGB art. 64. 
183. /d. art. 63. 
184. ld. In fact, after giving ajudge discretion to hand out punishment that suits the crime, the Code 
directs a judge to consider the motives, the prior life and the personal circumstances of the guilty 
person.ld. See generally § Ill. B. 2 for German Penal Code. 
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with a defendant's honorable motives. The German Penal Code allows a miti-
gated sentence if extenuating circumstances exist. One such extenuating circum-
stance is honorable motive. ls5 In some cases, the motives may be so benevolent 
that total exculpation of the actor is warranted. ls6 A physician who has acted 
with a benevolent motive in terminating the life of an individual lacks the malice 
which is a major element in the exigency to punish a person for homicide. 
The significance of these provisions of the Swiss Penal Code is that they clearly 
instruct ajudge to consider the honorable motives of the actor. IS7 Thus, a person 
who has committed euthanasia, and has acted with honorable motives towards 
the deceased, although convicted of a criminal offense, may nonetheless receive 
a reduced sentence. ISS The benefits accruing to the person convicted of an act of 
euthanasia are either total exculpation or mitigated sentence. 
4. Homicide Upon Request Under the German and Swiss Penal Codes 
Although unknown to the Anglo-Amt;rican world,1s9 many European penal 
codes recognize the concept of "homicide upon request."190 The significance of 
the "homicide upon request" provisions to this discussion is that this provision 
expressly allows a judge to mitigate the sentence of an individual who has 
committed a homicide when that individual performs the homicide at the re-
quest of the deceased. The underlying concept of this special provision for 
homicides committed at the request of the deceased is that murder, while always 
reprehensible, is less reprehensible when performed with the consent of the 
deceased than when performed against his will. 191 
The current German "homicide upon request" provision is not a modern 
response to the advances in medical technology. It has deep historical roots. The 
North German Federation Penal Code of 1870192 stated that: "[t]he sense of 
justice requires that killing a consenting person ... should not be punished as 
severely as killing a person against his will. But the uncontested moral principle 
that life is an inalienable value permits neither immunity nor a low penalty."193 
185. Sw. STGB art. 63. See generally § III. B. 2 for German Penal Code. 
186. GERMANN, supra note 173, at 56. 
187. Sw. STGB art. 64. 
188.ld. 
189. Silving, supra note 79, at 352. 
190. See STGB § 216; Sw. STGB art. 114. For the origins of the provision on "homicide upon 
request," see Decision of Feb. 7, 1952, Bundesgerichtshof (highest court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in civil and criminal matters) 258. The court pointed out that the German legislature 
introduced the provision into German law at a time when the premeditation and deliberation test was in 
force for the purpose of affording relief against the harshness of the test. ld. 
191. Silving, supra note 79, at 378. 
192. This code, Strafgesetzbuch fiir den Norddeutschen Bund of May 31, 1870, later became the 
Penal Code of the Reich, Law of May 15, 1871. For a brief discussion of this penal code, see A. KLENNER, 
DIE T6TUNG AUF VERLANGEN 1M DEUTSCHEN UNO AUSLANDISCHEN STRAFRECHT SO WIE DE LEGE FERANDA 
65 (1925) [he~einafter cited as KLENNER). 
193. Strafgesetzbuch fiir den Norddeutschen Bund of May 31, 1870. 
554 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. VI, No.2 
Although the North German Federation Penal Code of 1870 recognized the 
significance of a homicide by the request of a person,194 it made no special 
provisions to mitigate the punishment of a person convicted of such a murder.195 
In fact, the Penal Code never even considered the extenuating circumstances 
such as an euthanasia motive coupled with the person's request. 196 Today, 
however, "homicide upon request" is a separate instance of the general law of 
homicide in Germany.197 
The German Penal Code specifically mandates a reduction of penalty in the 
case of homicide upon request. 198 This reduction of both penalty and punish-
ment is justified on the grounds of the motivating compassion of the actor 
coupled with the consent of the deceased. 199 Article 216 of the German Penal 
Code states: 
1) If a person kills another after having been expressly and earnestly 
requested to do so by the person killed, the punishment shall be 
imprisonment for a term of not less than three years; 2) If extenuat-
ing circumstances are present, the punishment shall be imprison-
ment for a term of not less than six months; 3) The attempt IS 
punishable. 20o 
The Swiss Penal Code also treats "homicide upon request" as a special 
classification of homicide.201 Article 114 of the Swiss Penal Code states, 
"[w]hoever kills another upon the latter's earnest and urgent request is punish-
able by imprisonment."202 Although this provision punishes by imprisonment, 
some commentators theorize that the motive of the actor mitigates the punish-
ment considerably.203 Therefore, in practice, motivation of the actor and the 
deceased's request have been of substantial importance to the judge in making 
his determinations for punishment.204 This provision would also encompass a 
situation where the actor erroneously believes a request has been made and 
expedites that request.205 Again, this provision stresses the actor's motivation. If 
the actor, with benevolent motives, acts erroneously, he has not acted with 
194. /d. 
195. /d. 
196. E. v. USZT, U:HRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS 296-97 (22d ed. 1919). See also 
J. OLSHAUSEN, KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH 997 (1944). 
197. Silving, supra note 79, at 382. See also STGB § 216. 
198. See STGB § 216. 
199. See Dreher, Das Dritte Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz, JURISTENZEITUNG 421 (1953). 
200. STGB § 216. 
201. Sw. STGB art. 114. 
202. [d. 
203. Silving, supra note 79, at 383. 
204. /d. 
205. /d. 
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malice.206 In such a case, the doctrine of mistake of fact is involved.207 
The doctrine of mistake of fact suggests that while ignorance of the law is no 
defense, an actor still must possess the necessary ill will (mens rea)208 to commit a 
crime. Article 19 of the Swiss Penal Code defines the doctrine of mistake of fact: 
"Where the person has acted upon an erroneous conception of the factual 
situation, he will be judged in accordance with the factual situation as conceived 
by him when it works to his advantage.''209 Thus, if an actor erroneously per-
ceives that the deceased requested him to perform euthanasia and the actor 
carries out that request, the actor would be precluded from penalty because he 
lacked the necessary mens rea. 210 
In both Switzerland and Germany, the actor practicing euthanasia must follow 
the requirement of a "request." In Germany such request must be "express and 
earnest,"211 while in Switzerland the request must be "earnest and urgent."212 
The German Penal Code considers a request "expressed" if performed through 
gestures rather than words.213 If an individual makes a request in the heat of 
passion, the German Penal Code deems this request to be "earnest."214 The Swiss 
Penal Code deems a repeated request "urgent."215 The significance of the 
"homicide upon request" provision in both Germany and Switzerland is that a 
judge may consider the consenting plea of the deceased as a mitigating factor 
before pronouncing sentence. This mitigating factor has, therefore, become a 
special classification of homicide. 
Under both the German and Swiss penal systems, the benevolent motives of a 
person who practices euthanasia would lessen the penalty for the act. If the 
deceased requests the defendant to act, this too would be cause for a mitigated 
sentence. The emphasis on the actor's motive, as well as on the deceased's 
consent, is a step toward recognizing the right of a person to decide what is to 
happen with his person. 
206. Id. 
207. The Swiss court in Decision of Jan. 18, 1949,75 B G IV, at 26 held that error of law may lead to 
either total exculpation or a reduction in penalty. However, faultless error of law does not automatically 
lead to acquittal. Dec. of Mar. II, 1949, 75 B G IV, at 37; Decision of Apr. 7, 1949, 75 B G IV, at 76,82. 
Sw. STGB arts. 19-20 also may lead to exculpation or to a reduction in penalty. 
208. See Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Law, 24 AM. J. COMPo L. 646, 648 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Arzt]. 
209. Sw. STGB art. 19. 
210. See Arzt, supra note 208, at 648. See also E. BELING, UNSCHULD, SCHULD UNDE SCHULDSTUFEN 
(1910). Beling used euthanasia as an example of the "error juris" defense. Id. at 21. 
211. STGB § 216. 
212. Sw. STGB art. 114. 
213. SCHOENKE, supra note 7, at 579. 
214. Silving, supra note 79, at 384. 
215. GERMANN, supra note 173, at 227. 
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IV. CHANGES IN THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Development of Right to Die Laws 
Although the U.S. Congress has not enacted laws which have the same effect 
as the criminal laws of Germany and Switzerland,216 some state legislatures have 
passed statutes that would allow passive euthanasia.217 These state legislatures 
have enacted right to die statutes which recognize the legal validity of the 
"living will."218 The "living will" is a written directive through which an adult 
patient determines whether his doctors should permit him to die.219 
One of the purposes of the right to die laws is to free physicians and other 
health care professionals from potential criminal liability for honoring a patient's 
written directive.220 Before the enactment of these statutes, physicians who 
withheld life-sustaining devices or performed passive euthanasia risked criminal 
liability.221 This liability arises from a physician's legal duty to act.222 Under this 
concept once a physician and his patient have established a doctor-patient rela-
tionship, the physician has a duty to act reasonably toward his patient223 and to 
continue treatment as long as the case requires.224 The right to die laws establish 
a new duty - the duty not to act. This duty not to act arises from the patient's 
right to die peacefully.225 Several states thus grant immunity to the physician 
who acts in accordance with a patient's living wil1.226 
The living will is the most important component of the right to die statute.227 
The living will provides the adult patient, while still in possession of his full 
reasoning powers, with the means to exercise his "right of privacy over his body 
216. For the past 15 years Congress has been struggling to reform the criminal law. The type of 
reform Congress has considered centered around sentencing. Proposed reforms would allow a judge to 
consider defendant's danger to the community before allowing bail. Winter, Criminal Code Reform, 67 
A.B.A.J. 1431-32 (1981). 
217. See notes 239-52 infra. These statutes are discussed in § IV in/ra. These statutes allow a patient to 
determine whether he should be permitted to die by withholding of medical treatment (thus passive 
euthanasia is performed). 
218. SocIETY, supra note 19, at 1. The "living will" is also sometimes referred to as a "directive." Id. 
219. Id. 
220. For example, the California right to die statute states: "No physician or health facility which, 
acting in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient, shall be subject to civil liability [or be guilty of] any 
criminal act or ... unprofessional conduct." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West 1976). For 
additional exam pies see notes 239-52 infra. 
221. Foreman, supra note 5, at 55. 
222. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 338-50. See also Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1931); Thaggard v. 
Vafes, 218 Ala. 609,119 So. 647 (1928); Cochran v. Laton, 78 N.H. 562,103 A. 658 (1918); Mehigan v. 
Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51 A.2d 632 (1947). 
223. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 338-50. See also Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 
1973); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkson v. Vesey, 110 R.l. 
606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). 
224. Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 311, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (1937). 
226. See generally notes 239-52 infra. 
227. Every statute requires a living will as part of its provision. See statutes cited in notes 239-52 infra. 
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in determining whether he should be permitted to die."228 Under right to die 
statutes, the living will, which is similar to a testamentary document,229 provides 
that if a patient's health condition becomes terminal and physicians in their 
complete discretion are certain that the patient cannot regain his physical and 
mental capacities to function, then doctors should withdraw230 life-support 
treatment provided that at least two witnesses testify that the declarant was of 
sound mind and acted of his own free will when executing the document.231 
Problems arise under the right to die laws when the patient is an incompetent 
or a minor. Several statutes establish specific guidelines which allow a patient to 
appoint a proxy or a member of the patient's family, either of whom would have 
the power to make the decision for the patient.232 In addition, the patient may 
revoke the document at any time before he loses his soundness of mind.233 The 
declarant may revoke the document by a written or verbal statement expressing 
his intent to revoke.234 A qualified patient235 may also revoke a living will by 
cancelling, defacing, obliterating, burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the 
directive.236 
The basic right to die statute legally recognizes the right of a competent adult 
to refuse life-prolonging procedures if that adult is terminally il1.237 While each 
right to die statute is not identical, each contains certain basic similarities which 
provide necessary legal guidelines.238 Thirteen states and the District of Colum-
bia have right to die statutes, including California,239 Arkansas,24o New 
Mexico,241 Idaho,242 Oregon,243 Texas,244 Nevada,245 North Carolina,246 Kan-
228. Kutner, supra note 63, at 226. 
229. Id. at 228. 
The living will ... is analogous to the concept of a revocable or conditional trust, with the 
patient's body as the res, the patient himself as the beneficiary and grantor, and the doctor and 
hospital as trustees. The doctor is given authority to act as trustee of the patient's body by 
virtue of the patient's consent to treatment. 
Id. 
230. Lablang, Death with Dignity - A Tripartite Response, 2 DEATH EDUC. 171, 177 (1971). 
231. Model Bill § 3 (1978) (The Model Bill was written by Yale Law School for a Legislative Service 
Project. This bill is reprinted in SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 23-24.); Kutner, supra note 63, at 227. 
232. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-35-1 to -35-11 (1977); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 90-320 to -332 (1977). See also SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 5. 
233. Thus far, all but one state has specified revocation procedures. For states that have revocation 
procedures, see notes 239-52 infra except note 240 (Arkansas). SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 18. 
234. Kutner, supra note 63, at 227-28. 
235. The Model Bill defines a "qualified patient" as a "patient who has executed a declaration in 
accordance with this act and who has been diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a 
terminal condition by two physicians." Model Bill § 2, reprinted in SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 23-24. 
236. See generally notes 239-52 infra. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1976). 
240. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 (1977). 
241. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-35-1 to -11 (1977). 
242. IDAHO CODE § 39-4501 to -4508 (1977). 
243. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.050 to -061 (1977). 
558 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATiONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. VI, No.2 
sas,247 Washington,248 Alabama,249 District of Columbia,250 Vermont251 and Del-
aware.252 Each of the fourteen statutes provides a means for individuals to 
establish, in advance, their desire that no physicians use extraordinary measures 
to delay their dying.253 Besides granting immunity to physicians,254 these statutes 
require medical confirmation of the patient's terminal condition.255 Under the 
general statutory scheme, the physician is legally competent to determine 
whether the patient is in a hopeless and irreversible terminal condition.256 
In 1976, California257 became the first state to enact a right to die statute.258 
The California legislature intended that the California Natural Death Act259 
would provide a means by which a terminally ill individual could direct a 
physician to withhold or withdraw life-support mechanisms. 26o If a physician 
failed to effectuate the directive of the patient, the Act provided that this failure 
would constitute unprofessional conduct.261 The physician would be civilly liable 
for unprofessional conduct for failure to comply with the directive.262 The 
physician would be able to avoid this liability for unprofessional conduct by 
transferring the patient to a physician who would effectuate the directive.263 
With the enactment of the first right to die statutes, many pro-euthanasia 
groups believed that state legislatures had finally taken progressive steps for the 
legalization of euthanasia.264 However, the California right to die statute is 
demonstrative of several important drawbacks. The California legislature in-
tended the California Natural Death Act of 1976265 to provide the patient with 
244. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, §§ 1-12 (Vernon 1977). 
245. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to -551 (1977). 
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -332 (1977). 
247. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-128-101 to -109 (1979). 
248. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.01 to -.13 (1980). 
249. ALA. CODE § 22-A-l (1981). 
250. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2421-2429 (1982). 
251. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 (1982). 
252. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1982). 
253. SOCIETY, supra note 19, at 1. 
254. [d. at 2. For a comparison of these various right to die statutes, see id. at 18-21. Although only 13 
states have enacted right to die statues, many other states have considered or will consider similar bills. 
[d. 
255. See generaUy notes 239-52 supra. 
256. [d. 
257. This Note focuses on an analysis of the California living will statute as California adopted the 
first living will statute in the United States and most of the literature in the living will field centers 
around the California Natural Death Act. 
258. CAL. HEALTH Be SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1976) [hereinafter cited as Code). 
259. [d. 
260. See id. § 7188. See Dahlberg, TM California Natu.ral Death Act, 10 LiNCOLN L. REv. 197 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Dahlberg). 
261. See CODE § 7191 (b). 
262. [d. 
263. [d. 
264. Dahlberg, su.pra note 260, at 197. 
265. See note 258 supra. 
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autonomy and the right of self-determination.266 In reality, however, the Act was 
only a legislative compromise.267 The Act in practice does not fully satisfy the 
desires of the patient.26B The patient's right to decide is offset by the physician's 
discretion,269 since physicians, under the Act, may consider outside factors "such 
as information from the patient's family or the nature of the patient's illness, 
injury or disease."27o Such a weakening of the patient's rights could be avoided if 
the law deemed the patient's "living will" to be conclusive.271 
B. Analysis 
In the United States, euthanasia is punishable as homicide; however, the law in 
practice does not coincide with strict legal theory.272 This fact is evidenced by the 
"high iNcidence of failures to indict, acquittals, suspended sentences and re-
prieves."273 Some commentators suggest that euthanasia should be distinguished 
from other forms of homicide because of the humanitarian motive involved.274 
These scholars emphasize that euthanasia is distinguishable from other forms of 
homicide by consideration of the underlying motive as an element of culpabil-
ity.275 
In both Germany and Switzerland, the statutory law specifically takes cogni-
zance of the motivation of the actor276 in arriving at both "the grading of the 
charged offense and the ensuing sentence."277 In Germany, the motive is an 
element of the crime of murder.27B However, mercy is not one of the motives 
listed in the Penal Code as an element of murder. In Switzerland, motive is also 
an element of the crime since the statutes expressly instruct judges to consider 
the "homicide motives" of an individual in the sentencing process.279 Thus, the 
experience of Germany and. Switzerland may serve as a model to American 
legislatures considering motive as device for legalizing euthanasia. Several ap-
proaches are available to make euthanasia legal. The first approach is for the 
legislature to vest a broad discretion in. judges to classify cases within the various 
types of homicide based on motive.2Bo Legislatures might also enumerate in the 
266. Dahlberg, supra note 260, at 197. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 199. 
270. CODE § 7191. 
271. See Dahlberg, supra note 260, at 205. 
272. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 971. 
273. Id. 
274. See generally Williams, supra note 75. 
275. Id. 
276. See note 8 and § IV supra. 
277. Scher, supra note 21, at 676. 
278. STGB §§ 211·212. 
279. Sw. STGB arts. 63·64. 
280. These types include murder, manslaughter, manslaughter under extenuating circumstances 
and homicide upon request. 
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statutes themselves particular motives deserving exceptional treatment. 
Motive is a decisive element281 in the distinction between murder and man-
slaughter with their attendant, distinct penalties.282 Once ajudge equates motive 
with premeditation and deliberation, then he is better able to make a decision in 
a given case. If the basic objective of American, or any, criminal law system is to 
prevent harm to society,283 then the concept of motive as a substantive element 
of criminal law is useful. 284 Once motive is considered by American criminal law , 
then the judge and jury may hear evidence about why the defendant committed 
the act.285 
One of the essential elements of homicide in American criminal law is malice 
aforethought.286 Because malice is an integral element, judges should consider 
the motive of an individual who has practiced euthanasia to ascertain whether 
the required malice is present. 287 If the judge then observes that the individual 
did not entertain the same malicious motive or intent as a murderer but rather as 
a concerned citizen, the individual would receive a mitigated sentence. Thus, an 
individual who is motivated by benevolence would be subject to a less severe 
punishment than a criminal who is motivated by evil. 
Another approach that would mitigate the circumstances of a person who 
practices euthanasia is to adopt the "homicide upon request" provision of the 
penal codes of Germany and Switzerland.288 This provision would allow a miti-
gated sentence for homicide on the grounds that the compassion motivating the 
actor and the consenting plea of the deceased reduces the reprehensibility of the 
act.289 Thus far, American criminal law has never recognized the consent of the 
deceased as a defense to criminal homicide.290 Currently, American criminal law 
advocates that: "Murder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at 
the desire of the victim. He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in 
the judgment of the law, as much a murderer as if he had done it merely of his 
own head .... "291 
Opponents to euthanasia have attacked the European based "homicide upon 
request" provision by comparing it with the common law crime of assistance in 
suicide.292 These opponents fear that homicide upon request is open for 
281. Scher, supra note 21, at 676. 
282. Silving, supra note 79, at 363. 
283. LA FAVE & ScOTT, supra note 60, at 21. 
284. See Scher, supra note 21, at 676. 
285 . .J. HALL, GENERAL i'JuNCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 83-93 (2d ed. 1960). 
286. LA FAVE & ScOTT, supra note 60, at 528. 
287. Silving, supra note 79, at 362. 
288. STGB § 216; Sw. STGB art. 114. 
289. See § III supra. 
290. See State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 476, 121 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1961), citing Turner v. State, 119 
Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908). 
291. Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908). 
292. Kutner, supra note 63, at 204-05. 
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abuse.293 This same fear lies behind the policy in making assistance in suicide 
illegal.294 To reduce the potential for abuse the provision should contain specific 
safeguards. 
Article 115 of the Swiss Penal Code could serve as a model for such 
safeguards. Article 115 states that "[w]hoever from selfish motives, induces 
another to commit suicide or assists him therein" is punishable. 295 Thus, if one 
person persuades another to commit suicide out of selfish motives,296 the in-
stigator would be punishable. However, if a physician, motivated by a feeling of 
mercy, practices euthanasia or assists in a patient's suicide, consideration of this 
altruistic motive would eliminate the need to apply this safeguard. 297 To com-
plete this statutory scheme, homicide upon request should be incorporated into 
criminal law as a special classification of homicide, similar to the crime of 
assistance in suicide but with a lessened sentence.298 The majority of states have 
decriminalized either suicide or its assistance.299 
The German provision of "manslaughter with extenuating circumstances"30o 
is another approach that the American criminal justice system could incorporate. 
This provision calls for a mitigation of the sentence of an individual if he 
commits homicide under "extenuating circumstances."30! Like the provision of 
"homicide upon request,"302 this provision is a special classification of homicide. 
This classification is somewhat similar to the American classification of voluntary 
manslaughter, where an individual's sentence is mitigated because of provoca-
tion.303 When an individual has performed euthanasia, courts would consider 
the existence of the euthanasia motive as an "extenuating circumstance."304 
However, if a court finds no extenuating circumstances but rather that an 
individual has committed murder, the court would have no reason to apply this 
provision. 
The three proposed approaches to possible reforms in American criminal law 
are by no means a complete answer to the complex moral and legal problems of 
euthanasia. Rather, they serve to demonstrate the manner in which some foreign 
legal systems deal with this same issue. Foreign law can be a useful model for 
reexamination of American criminal law treatment of mercy killing. Distinctions 
between various types of homicide are useful to consider. One criteria for 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Sw. STGB art. 115. 
296. Id. 
297. Silving, supra note 79, at 387. 
298. Assistance in suicide is only a crime in a very small minority of states. See generally note 109 supra. 
299. Id. 
300. STGB § 213. 
301. Id. 
302. STGB § 216. 
303. LA FAVE & ScOTT, supra note 60, at 593. 
304. See Silving, supra note 79, at 367. 
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making these distinctions is the motive of the actor. Motive as an element of a 
crime has worked well for Germany and Switzerland. Contrasting an evil motive 
with a beneficient or merciful motive as an element of murder raises questions 
concerning the purpose of making homicide a crime. The answer to these 
questions should prove helpful in the debate over the legal status of euthanasia. 
A caieful approach would not legalize murder, but would acknowledge that 
actions of mercy are distinct from the moral reprehension normally associated 
with homicide. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issue of euthanasia has become important in recent years because 
euthanasia is arguably a solution to some dilemmas created by advances in 
medical technology. Today, medical technology has the capability in many 
instances to maintain a human life far beyond the point which an individual 
would desire. Euthanasia gives the terminally ill patient a free choice. However, 
the act of euthanasia in the United States is a crime of willful homicide. Despite 
this fact, physicians continue to practice euthanasia. 
In contrast, the statutory laws of Germany and Switzerland treat euthanasia 
very differently. Germany and Switzerland's Penal Codes have certain provisions 
which expressly state that when a person has committed a homicide upon 
request of the deceased, or out of honorable motives, a mitigated sentence 
should be applied. Although the United States has not progressed in the same 
fashion as Germany and Switzerland, some state legislatures have dealt with the 
question of choice for the terminally ill by enacting right to die statutes which 
allow a terminally ill patient to request withdrawal from any and all treatment. 
However, these statutes are less than what pro-ethanasia societies have requested 
because they provide the treating physician with the discretion to undermine a 
patient's choice. 
A comparison of the statutory laws of Germany and Switzerland to those of the 
United States shows that certain provisions of these two European penal codes 
might serve as a useful model for changes in American criminal law with respect 
to euthanasia. Such a model would enable the participants in the debate concern-
ing euthanasia to explore possible approaches other than the ones now available 
in American criminal law. With expanded alternatives, legislatures may be able 
to resolve the issue of euthanasia to a greater satisfaction than is presently 
practiced. 
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